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Employer: Beware of "Hostile Environment" Sexual
Harassment
The women's rights movement has progressed to the point where
it has become a common occurrence to see women emerging as
corporate executives, members of Congress, and Presidential candidates. At the same time, women have entered the workforce of
American businesses at a rate greater than ever. Proportionate to the
emergence of the woman worker in America is the greater increase
of incidents of sexual harassment of working women by males. Sexual
harassment has been defined as "the unwanted imposition of sexual
requirements in the context of a relationship of unequal power."'
This definition encompasses all types of harassment including harassment of men by women and men or women by members of the
same sex. 2 Sexual harassment is a form of discrimination in employment and is a cognizable violation of section 703 of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.3 In 1980, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) promulgated guidelines in which sexual
harassment was further defined:
(a)Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other
verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when (1) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or
implicitly a term or condition of an individual's employment, (2)
submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as
a basis for employment decisions affecting such individual, or (3) such
conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an
individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or
4
offensive working environment.

1. MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of Working Women 1 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as MacKinnon].
2. For the purposes of this article the term "sexual harassment" will describe
only harassment of women by men.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1972).
The relevant portion of Title VII states: It shall be an unlawful employment
practice for an employer - (1) to fail or refuse to hire or discharge any
individual, or otherwise to discriminiate against any individual with respect to
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of

such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
See also Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,
-U.S.
-, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 91 L.
Ed.2d 49 (1986); Ferguson v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., Inc., 560 F. Supp.

1172, 1196 (D. Del. 1983); Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Guidelines
on Sexual Harassment, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) [hereinafter cited as "Guidelines"].
4. Guidelines, § 1604.11(a) supra note 3.
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Recent case law5 and some scholars 6 have divided sexual harassment
into two distinct categories. The first category is described as quid
pro quo sexual harassment. 7 This type of harassment is created when
an employee's supervisor or a person of higher employment rank
demands sexual favors from a subordinate in exchange for tangible
job benefits." The second type of sexual harassment is termed hostile
environment sexual harassment. 9 This form of harassment comprises
claims of women employees that have been subjected to an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment in which to work.10 In a
hostile environment claim, the female employee normally argues that,
because of her sex, she is forced to tolerate abusive conditions in
which to earn a living.1 In such instances, she does not claim she
was denied tangible job opportunities or benefits because of her
gender.' 2 Rather, she claims that the working environment has become
polluted with verbal or physical abuses of a sexual nature. 3 Sexual

5. Miller v. Bank of America, 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979); Henson v. City
of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982); Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251 (4th Cir.
1983).
6. MacKinnon, at 32-47; Sexual Harassment Claims of Abusive Work Environment Under Title VII, 97 HARv. L. REV. 1449 (1984) [hereinafter cited as
Harassment Claims].
7. MacKinnon, at 32-40. Professor MacKinnon stated that women's experiences of sexual harassment can be divided into two distinct categories, quid pro
quo and condition of work.
8. Although the elements of a prima facie case for sexual harassment are
not fully settled, see Robson v. Eva's Super Market, Inc., 538 F. Supp. 857 (N.D.
Ohio 1982), the court in Henson outlined elements necessary to prove a prima facie
case for sexual harassment under Title VII. However, quid pro quo sexual harassment
is analytically similar to claims of sex or race discrimination based upon a disparate
treatment theory, and as such, the traditional Title VII framework can be utilized.
See also McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)(holding that a plaintiff
in disparate treatment cases must first establish a prima facie case. The burden of
production then shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for its actions, and the plaintiff then has the burden of persuading the trier
of fact that the defendant's reasons were pretext).
9. The United States Supreme Court used the term hostile environment in
referring to non quid pro quo type harassment. 106 S. Ct. at 2405. Professor
MacKinnon uses the term condition of work to describe non quid pro quo sexual
harassment. MacKinnon, at 32.
10. See Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 584 F. Supp. 419, 432-33 (E.D.
Mich. 1984), where the court thoroughly analyzed the EEOC guidelines and defined
instances in which a working environment can become either intimidating, hostile,
or offensive.
11. See Harassment Claims at 1455, supra note 6.
12. Id.
13. Id. See also MacKinnon, at 40; Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d
897, 902 (11th Cir. 1982); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 943-45 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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harassment, based upon claims of a hostile environment, is actionable
4
even where the victim does not suffer a tangible, economic harm.
This article will focus on the hostile environment type of sexual
harassment. Part I discusses a standard from which to assess conduct
that is claimed to create a hostile environment. Part II discusses the
corresponding responsibilities of employer and employee with regard
to claims of hostile environment sexual harassment. Part III suggests
a framework for employers seeking to eliminate this type of harassment from the workplace. 5
I.

A

STANDARD FOR ASSESSING HARASSING CONDUCT

The early decisions regarding sexual harassment as a cognizable
cause of action conceptualize the problem as a personal rather than
a social phenomena.1 6 This conceptualization by the courts focused
on the theory that sexual harassment would encompass only extremely
outrageous and abusive behavior by powerful individuals over subordinates.1 7 Such extreme behavior would probably be limited to
firing a female employee who refused the sexual demands of her
boss.'" Limiting a cause of action for sexual harassment in this
manner is a rather narrow approach to the problem and is contrary
to Congress's intentions in enacting Title VII.' 9 The goal behind the
enactment of this statute was to eliminate discrimination from the
workplace.

20

14. Meritor Savings Bank, 106 S. Ct. at 2406; Bundy, 641 F.2d at 943-44;
Henson, 682 F.2d at 902. See also Los Angeles Department of Water & Power v.
Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978)(holding that Congress, in enacting Title VII, intended
to eliminate disparate treatment of men and women).
15. This article does not discuss employer liability for conduct which is
deemed a violation of Title VII, it merely attempts to outline the standards utilized
for determining at what point the working environment becomes unbearable to work
in. It should be noted that in quid pro quo sexual harassment situations employers
are liable under agency principles of respondeat superior. See Katz v. Dole, 709
F.2d 251, 255 (4th Cir. 1983); Henson, 682 F.2d at 910; Coley v. Consolidated Rail
Corp., 561 F. Supp. 645, 650 (E.D. Mich. 1982). In hostile environment cases an
employer is only liable if the employer knew or should have known of the activity.
See Katz, 709 F.2d at 255; Henson, 682 F.2d at 905; Bundy, 641 F.2d at 943;
Coley, 561 F. Supp. at 650.
16. See Tompkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553, 556
(D. N.J. 1976), rev'd, 568 F.2d 1044, 1048-49 (3d Cir. 1977); Miller v. Bank of
America, 418 F. Supp. 233, 234 (N.D. Cal. 1976), rev'd, 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir.
1979); Care v. Bausch & Lombe, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1975), vacated,
562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977); see also Harassment Claims supra note 6, at 1452.
17. See Harassment Claims at 1452.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1973).
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Because harassing behavior takes many forms, from outrageous
abuse, such as sexual assault and rape, to mere sexist comments,
courts need to adopt a standard from which actionable conduct can
be assessed. The United States Supreme Court, while not fully
addressing the issue of what standard should be utilized, stated in
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson 21 that in order to be actionable,
sexual harassment must be "sufficiently severe or pervasive" such
that one's working conditions have been altered and an abusive
environment has been created. 22 The threshold question, therefore, is
what conduct can be classified as severe and pervasive enough to
meet this criterion? Do sexist remarks in the work environment
amount to actionable harassment if the victim is an extreme feminist?
A second threshold question, and perhaps fundamental to answering
the first, is from whose viewpoint should the determination that
conduct is outrageous be made? Should conduct be assessed objectively from the viewpoint of the reasonable supervisor, employer, or
boss? Should conduct be assessed objectively from the viewpoint of
the reasonable woman, victim or person? Perhaps conduct should be
assessed subjectively from the particular viewpoint of the harasser or
victim. Recent cases have not explicitly adopted a standard from
which to make this important factual determination, rather, courts
have been deciding sexual harassment claims based upon the partic23
ular facts of each case.
As the following analysis will demonstrate, adopting a subjective
standard in these cases will not serve the intent of Congress in
eliminating abusive environments nor will the adoption of a subjective
standard protect employers from frivolous lawsuits. The adoption of
an objective standard from the reasonable employer's viewpoint
would be too difficult to define and would all but eliminate the
hostile environment claims. The correct standard to utilize in hostile
environment cases is the objective standard from the viewpoint of
the reasonable person in the same or similar circumstances. By
assessing alleged harassing behavior from the viewpoint of the reasonable supervisor, courts run the risk of condoning conduct which

21.
- U.S. -, 106 S. Ct. 2399, 91 L. Ed.2d 49 (1986).
22. Id. at 2406, quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th
Cir. 1982).
23. See Barrett v. Omaha Nat'l Bank, 584 F. Supp. 22, 29 (D. Neb. 1983);
Ferguson, 560 F. Supp. at 1198; Scott v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 798 F.2d 210, 213
(7th Cir. 1986); Robson v. Eva's Supermarket, Inc., 538 F. Supp. 857, 861 (N.D.
Ohio 1982).
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is not outrageous or severe. Adopting this approach would be akin
to allowing male supervisors to harass or degrade female employees
to the point where the harassment would become unreasonable. This
would circumvent Congress' goal of eliminating all forms of discrim24
ination from the workplace.
The ideal working environment is one where employees and supervisors work together to achieve maximum efficiency. Both employer and employee hope that the work environment is amicable
and friendly, but realistically speaking, personalities sometimes clash
and the ambiance so often strived for in the work environment is
unavoidably absent. In such circumstances, supervisors should not
be permitted to use their powerful positions to abuse and degrade
employees. Furthermore, the mythological reasonable supervisor would
be extremely difficult to define because supervisors are as different
as the job and the worker they supervise. Such a conceptualization
would be virtually impossible because the reasonable supervisor could
take varying forms, from friendly to indifferent, from task-oriented
to goal-oriented. Therefore, adopting this standard would probably
create a greater ambiguity than it would cure.
Utilizing a subjective standard from the viewpoint of the particular
harassing supervisor to make determinations of fact regarding the
specific allegations of harassment would also circumvent the mission
of Title VII. This standard would allow a court to determine whether
or not harassment had occurred based upon the subjective thought
processes of the alleged harasser. In most instances of sexual harassment by a male supervisor of a female employee, the supervisor
subjectively believed that his behavior was not problematic. 25 It is
clear that males do not, as a rule, perceive sexual episodes as the
assaults their victims believe them to be.2 6 Hence, in many harassment
situations, the female feels as though she is being subjected to sexual
harassment, while her alleged harasser believes that his conduct is
merely trivial and harmless. Therefore, if such a subjective standard
were based upon the view of the harassing supervisor, then hostile
environment sexual harassment claims would become virtually extinct.
Although the Guidelines state in section 1604.11(a)(3) that harassment has occurred if conduct has the purpose or effect of creating

24.

Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.

25. See Barrett, 584 F. Supp. at 24; Ferguson 560 F. Supp. at 1182; Walter
v. KFGO Radio, 518 F. Supp. 1309, 1314 (D.N.D. 1981).
26. MacKinnon, at 163; see also supra note 1.
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an abusive behavior, 27 it should not be applied to give an employee
a cause of action merely because an employer intended to offend the
employee but failed to do so. This would, in effect, lead to an
onslaught of frivolous lawsuits.
Because of the divergence of male and female perceptions as to
what constitutes offensive behavior, choosing a standard from which
to evaluate behavior should result in the use of an objective standard.2 8 Utilizing a subjective standard from the viewpoint of the
victim would pose unreasonable dangers because using the subjective
supervisor standard would greatly diminish employer liability for
sexual harassment. As a result, utilizing a subjective victim standard
would flood the courts with Title VII actions. 29 If a subjective victim
standard were used, trivial conduct, sexist remarks, and isolated, yet
not severe, instances of sexist behavior would become actionable so
long as the victim perceived such conduct as creating a hostile
environment.
The Supreme Court has implicitly denounced the use of this
standard by stating that not all' conduct that may be described as
harassment is actionable. 0 Also, some federal courts have held that
trivial and annoying conduct is not harassment," and that in order
to be actionable the conduct must be severe enough to alter the
conditions of the victim's employment and create a hostile, intimidating or offensive working environment.3 2 In addition to this rigid
standard, a plaintiff must prove that the conduct was persistent
enough to seriously affect the plaintiff's psychological well-being.33
The Guidelines, section 1604.11(b), state that the totality of the

27. See Guidelines, § 1604.11(a)(3).
28. As was discussed earlier in the article, using a subjective standard from
the victim's viewpoint would permit oversensitive victims to state an actionable claim
for any sexist behavior; also, using a subjective standard from the harasser's
viewpoint would practically eliminate hostile environment sexual harassment actions.
29. Id.
30. See Meritor Savings Bank, 106 S. Ct. at 2405, citing Rogers v. EEOC,
454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971).
31. See Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 584 F. Supp. 419 (E.D. Mich.
1984); Scott v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 798 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1986).
32. See Henson, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982); Barrett v. Omaha Nat. Bank,
584 F. Supp. 22 (D. Neb. 1983); Downes v. F.A.A., 775 F.2d 288 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
33. Id. See also Scott, 798 F.2d at 213; Ferguson v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours
& Co., Inc., 560 F. Supp. 1172 (D. Del. 1983)(holding that not every sexual
innuendo or flirtation gives rise to an action for sex discrimination); Rogers v.
EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971) (holding that mere utterances of ethnic or
racial slurs which evoke offensive feelings in an employee are not actionable).
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circumstances of each particular case will be taken into consideration.3 4 This approach has been followed by many courts that have
decided sexual harassment cases.3 5 By allowing courts to consider the
totality of the circumstances, the Guidelines have effectively promoted
the use of a subjective victim standard.16 The wording of section
1604.11(b), that the nature of the conduct and the context in which
it occurred will be considered, allows courts giving deference to these
Guidelines to find actionable harassment even in instances where the
conduct was not severe, pervasive or psychologically abusive.3 7 Two
recent cases, Barrett v. Omaha National Bank" and Ferguson v. E.
L DuPont de Nemoursa9 superbly illustrate this notion.
In Barrett, the plaintiff, along with three co-employees of the
defendant bank, 40 attended a seminar in a distant city which was a
few hours drive from the branch office. The plaintiff alleged that
41
during the trip she was subjected to verbal and physical harassment.
The physical harassment which she alleged amounted to offensive
touching which occurred while she was seated in the middle of the
automobile between the two male employees. 42 The verbal harassment
amounted to lewd sexual comments and a practical joke in which
the two men allegedly told plaintiff that because of a mistake in
43
reservations the three of them would have to share a hotel room.
The District Court of Nebraska found that the activity which took
place on the trip amounted to sexual harassment."4 The court went
on to determine whether or not the defendant bank had shown that

34. See Guidelines, § 1604.11(b). The relevant portion of § 1604.11(b) states:
"In determining whether alleged conduct constitutes sexual harrassment, the Commission will look at the record as a whole and at the totality of the circumstances.
35. Guidelines, § 1604.11(b); Henson, 682 F.2d at 904; Ferguson, 560 F.
Supp. at 1198; see Calcote v. Texas Educational Foundation, Inc., 458 F. Supp.
231, 237 (N.D. Tex. 1976), aff'd, 578 F.2d 95 (5th Cir. 1978).
36. See Barrett, 584 F. Supp. at 30, where the court stated: "while the usual
rule is that trivial or isolated events do not give rise to liability, this court feels that
the instant case warrants a different result." See also Ferguson, 560 F. Supp. at
1198, where the court assumed that the plaintiff established the requirement that
the complained of conduct be severe or pervasive.
37. Id.
38. 584 F. Supp. 22 (D. Neb. 1983).
39. 560 F. Supp. 1172 (D. Del. 1983).
40. Although the other two employees were not the plaintiff's direct supervisors, one of them was acting in a managerial capacity.
41. Barrett, 584 F. Supp. at 24.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 29.

DUQUESNE LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 26:461

the harassment was so isolated and trivial as to effectively rebut the
plaintiff's allegations. 45 The court stated: "While the usual rule is
that trivial or isolated events do not give rise to liability, this court
feels that the instant case warrants a different result." ' 46 The court
acknowledged that the conduct of the two males was isolated and
trivial, however, it noted that since the plaintiff was in a vehicle47
with no escape, the complained of conduct could not be rebutted.
This is an obvious instance where isolated and trivial conduct was
held actionable.
The plaintiff's perception that she was harassed served as the
standard by which the court seemingly made the determination that
the plaintiff had stated a cause of action. This determination was
made even though the conduct of the two males had not been
"unwelcome" in that the plaintiff had engaged in conversation with
one of the two men regarding her intimate sex life. 48 In this case, if
the subjective perception of the two men would have been the basis
for determining whether their conduct created a hostile environment,
it is probable that a cause of action would not have been stated.
In Ferguson, the plaintiff alleged that her supervisor made sexist
remarks about her, inquired about her sexual activity, referred to
her as his girlfriend, and on one occasion, smacked her on the
buttocks. 49 The District Court of Delaware used the subjective victim
standard in finding that the complained of conduct was such that
the plaintiff could find it insulting. 0 Analyzing this particular set of
facts, the court noted that "not every sexual innuendo or flirtation
gives rise to an actionable wrong,"'" but in order to state a cause of
action for hostile environment sexual harassment, the conduct complained of must be severe, pervasive and sufficient to seriously affect
the plaintiff's psychological well-being. 2 The threshold question was
whether the supervisor's actions were severe enough to meet this
requirement. 3 The court assumed that the "relatively few enumerated

45.
46.
47.
48.
employee,
discussed
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id.
Id. at 30.
Id.
Id. at 23, 29. Mrs. Barrett occasionally talked to Mr. Day, a bank
about her sexual relationship with her boyfriend, and also occasionally
sexual relationships of Mr. Day.
560 F. Supp. at 1198.
Id. at 1197.
Id. at 1198, citing Rogers, 454 F.2d at 238.
Ferguson, 560 F. Supp. at 1198. See also Henson, 682 F.2d at 904.
Ferguson, 560 F. Supp. at 1197.
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incidents '5 4 complained of by the plaintiff were enough for her to
establish the element of pervasiveness."
It does not follow that a few trivial incidents would be enough
for a plaintiff to meet the pervasiveness burden, unless those few
incidents were highly offensive or when added together amounted to
psychological harm. The plaintiff in Ferguson would probably not
have stated a cause of action if an objective standard were used, or
if a subjective supervisor standard were used.
The pervasiveness standard was first enunciated in Henson v. City
of Dundee.16 There, the plaintiff alleged that during her two years
with the City of Dundee Police Department she was subjected to
demeaning vulgarities and requests for sexual relations. 7 The city
manager took no action to curtail this abuse after being notified by
the plaintiff, and she was prevented from attending the local police
academy because she refused the sexual advances. 8 The Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held specifically that in order for
sexual harassment to be actionable under Title VII, it must be
"sufficiently pervasive," severe and persistent to seriously affect the
employee's psychological welfare.5 9 The requirement is given little or
no meaning if hostile environment sexual harassment claims are
decided by assessing the severity of the conduct through the eyes of
the victim. If this standard, the subjective victim standard, continues
to be utilized, then federal courts will soon become backlogged with
sexual harassment claims.
In all facets of employment-from office buildings to steel millswhere men and women must work together, it is inevitable that
insulting and offending remarks will be occasionally directed at
women workers by male supervisors. It is unfortunate that sexual
stereotypes are still harbored and are sometimes directed at women
on the job. However, each insult or sexist remark should not create
a cause of action. This is not to say that the price women must or

54. Id. at 1198. The plaintiff perceived certain actions on the part of her
supervisor to be abusive. These actions consisted of the supervisor smacking her on
the buttocks on one occasion, calling her into his office for "heart to breast" talks,
referring to her as his girlfriend, inquiring about her sexual proclivities, making
coarse comments to her, and describing his working relationship with her by analogy
to the marital state.
55. Id.
56. 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982).
57. Id. at 899-900.
58. Id. at 904.
59.

Id.
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should pay for entering the workforce is the risk that they will be
sexually abused. Suffice to say that a small degree of thick skin is
probably required, on the part of everyone, to be a part of the
American workforce.
The EEOC Guidelines require that the discrimination of sexually
harassed employees be "unreasonable" before it is actionable. 60 The
Guidelines recognize the EEOC's awareness that de minimis conduct
can, in certain situations, be actionable by allowing the EEOC to
look to the record of each particular case to determine whether sexual
6
harassment has occurred. '
This caveat allows courts, as the Barrett and Ferguson courts did,
to consider the context and the nature of the alleged incidents in
determining whether the conduct is actionable. 62 Hence, the Guidelines provide that isolated and trivial acts may be actionable. It seems
as though this. caveat in the Guidelines may have been misinterpreted. 63 Rather than allowing a cause of action for isolated and
trivial occurrences by permitting courts to consider the context and
nature of the conduct, section 1604.11(b) should be read to allow a
cause of action where one incident alone is so severe and debilitating
that the required harm to a plaintiff has resulted. Thus, isolated and
trivial incidents would still not state a cause of action, but the courts
would have an out in cases where one incident is claimed as the
basis for the action. This interpretation would emphasize the nature
of the alleged conduct in determining whether or not an isolated
incident was severe enough to be actionable.

60. Guidelines, § 1604.11(a)(3). It should be noted that the Guidelines are
not controlling upon courts, but do constitute a body of experience to which courts
can resort for guidance. Meritor Savings Bank, 106 S. Ct. at 2405.
61. Guidelines, § 1604.11(b). The relevant portion of this section reads:
In determining whether alleged conduct constitutes sexual harassment, the
Commission will look at the record as a whole and at the totality of the
circumstances, such as the nature of the sexual advances and the context in
which the alleged incidents occurred. The determination of the legality of a
particular action will be made from the facts, on a case by case basis.
Id.
62. See Barrett, 584 F. Supp. at 28-30; Ferguson, 560 F. Supp. at 1196-99,
where the court stated that not every flirtation or sexual innuendo gives rise to a
cause of action, but in this particular case the plaintiff could find the acts of which
she complained to be reasonably insulting. Neither the Barrettcourt nor the Ferguson
court cited § 1604.11(b), however, both courts gave deference to the guidelines as
a whole in deciding sexual harassment cases. Barrett, 584 F. Supp. at 28-30;
Ferguson, 560 F. Supp. at 1196-99.
63. Although § 1604.11(b) was not interpreted in Barrett or Ferguson, it has
been used as persuasive authority in resolving such conflicts.
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There still remains the necessity of adopting an objective standard
in all hostile environment sexual harassment claims. This standard
would assess conduct through the eyes of the proverbial reasonable
person in similar circumstances. By utilizing such a standard, courts
would be able to determine with uniformity what type of behavior
would be actionable. Plaintiffs should be required to prove that a
series of related incidents had occurred which the reasonable person
in the plaintiff's work environment would find offensive. In other
words, the plaintiff would demonstrate an environment free from
abuse changed to one that became intolerable to a reasonable person.
A plaintiff would not have to prove that the behavior was so severe
and pervasive that her psychological well-being was affected, but
would merely have to show that a reasonable person would now find
the working environment intolerable. This would eliminate causes of
action where a particularly sensitive individual is subjectively offended
and at the same time would protect women from unreasonable and
uncalled-for abuses.
Another concern of a sexual harassment analysis is the classification
of insults and verbal abuses as actionable sexual harassment. 64 The
concern here is that many times the sexual harassment which is
present in a work environment contains mostly verbal abuses or mere
insults. By allowing causes of action for verbal abuses only, courts
could be impinging a person's first amendment right to freedom of
expression. 65 Because the right of free speech (as long as it is not
obscene) is such an important one, a different standard would have
to be adopted. Such a standard would consider the frequency and
severity of the abusive language in determining whether first amendment rights have been violated. In other words, only where verbal
abuses alone are so outrageous and severe that the employee is
psychologically affected, would a claim be actionable. This analysis
is the current standard supposedly used in sexual harassment claims,
although in many instances this standard is not applied. 66 Of course,
this analysis would be a painstaking process for any court. Therefore,

64.

See Rabidue, 584 F. Supp. at 431. The court stated that where the

complained of conduct is "verbal abuse of a sexual nature", a first amendment
issue is raised.
65. Id. The issue in such instances is framed as follows: Can Title VII
prohibit people from verbally expressing themselves with language that is not obscene

under the legal definition of the term?
66. See Barrett, 584 F. Supp. 22 (D. Neb. 1983) and Ferguson, 560 F. Supp.
1172 (D. Del. 1983).
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one approach to this type of claim would be for a court to consider
the totality of the circumstances as described in section 1604.11(b)
of the Guidelines.
Although the totality of the circumstances should always be considered in these types of cases, in verbal abuse only situations, courts
could look closely to find one instance of offensive touching or some
other non-verbal offensive conduct. In many sexual harassment claims,
one such incident can usually be found, even though most of the
abuse claimed is merely verbal. 67 Hence, if one incident of non-verbal
behavior, such as offensive touching or having to perform demeaning
tasks, is present in conjunction with outrageous and severe verbal
abuse, the first amendment protections would not be granted. 68 Courts

could then find liability if a reasonable person in the same situation
would find that the working environment had changed from nonabusive to abusive.
An example of this analysis can be found in the recent case of
Porta v. Rollins Environmental Services, Inc. 69 There, the plaintiff
70
was hired as a shift supervisor of the Rollins plant in New Jersey.
She claimed that the defendant created an intimidating, hostile or
offensive working environment because she was allegedly subjected
to crude comments, humiliating treatment, and was told that her
opinion was not respected because she was a woman. 71 The District
Court of New Jersey held, in denying defendant's motion for summary judgment, that a jury could find that the conduct of which the
plaintiff complained was actionable sexual harassment.72 The specific
conduct of which the plaintiff complained amounted to sexually
offensive handwritten notes directed to her, crude graffiti bearing
her name on a staff refrigerator, and crude remarks made by male
73
supervisors about her breast size.

The plaintiff also claimed that her job was terminated because of
this harassment. 74 She refused to work weekends because much of

67.
68.

See Barrett, 584 F. Supp. at 23-24; Katz, 709 F.2d at 254.
Courts could look to the totality of the circumstances to determine if an

isolated or trivial act of touching was present along with the verbal abuses. Even if
the touching would not itself be actionable, coupled with severe verbal abuses, it
would be enough to overcome first amendment protection.
69. 654 F. Supp. 1275 (D. N.J. 1987).

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at

1278.
1282.
1279.
1280.
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the harassment allegedly occurred when a certain supervisor was at
the plant on weekends. 7 Here, the court did not decide whether the
defendant was ultimately liable to the plaintiff, but rather the court
denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment. This case is
illustrative of a situation where most of the harassing behavior is
verbal. A court deciding whether or not liability should rest with the
defendant would most certainly have to address whether or not the
verbal expression by the defendant's supervisor was protected by the
first amendment.
Using an analysis where a court would consider the totality of the
circumstances to determine whether there was any non-verbal abuse,
which in conjunction with verbal abuse could overcome first amendment protections, courts could reasonably determine that the plaintiff's discharge was related to the abusive behavior. Job dismissal
affects a person's economic posture. If such a dismissal is related to
verbal abuses, then first amendment protection would not be granted.
Thus, liability could be found if the reasonable victim standard were
then applied to determine if a reasonable person in these circumstances would find that the working environment had changed from
non-abusive to abusive.
In Katz v. Dole,76 the plaintiff, an air traffic controller, was
subjected to a workplace pervaded with sexual slurs, insults and
innuendoes, 77 and was personally the object of vulgar and sexually
related language. 78 In addition to the vulgar and offensive language
of which she complained, there was evidence that the plaintiff was
also the object of sexual advances. 79 Although it is difficult to define
"sexual advances", harassment has been described as including repeated, unwanted sexual propositions, non-consensual touching, and
extortion of sexual favors.80 Others have equated "sexual advances"
to sexual incidents, including demands for sexual relations. 8 Again,
a gray area is encountered. Flirtatious behavior and romantic attrac-

75. Id. at 1279.
76. 709 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1983).
77. Id. at 254.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See McLain, The EEOC Sexual Harassment Guidelines: Welcome Advances Under Title VII, 10 U. BAIT. L. REv. 275 (1980) [hereinafter cited as EEOC
Sexual Harassment Guidelines].
81. MacKinnon, at 31.
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tion surely cannot be classified as "sexual advances" in the sense of
harassment.1

2

The United States Supreme Court in Meritor Savings Bank implicitly suggests that "sexual advances" are conduct. 83 In analyzing the
discrepancy between voluntariness to a sexual relationship and unwelcomeness to sexual advances, the Court noted that the plaintiff's
conduct was voluntary, i.e., she did not have to participate against
her will to her supervisor's outward manifestations of a sexual
relationship.8 4 However, the Court emphasized that the proper inquiry
was whether or not the sexual advances were welcome.8 5 Hence, the
Court decided that in hostile environment sexual harassment claims
the conduct of the harasser must be analyzed in conjunction with
the conduct of the victim to determine whether or not sexual advances
were welcome or unwelcome. It seems that the criterion for determining the difference between welcome and unwelcome behavior is
subjective from the victim's point of view.8 6 There is nothing wrong
with this type of analysis because in order for behavior to be
considered harassing it must not be requested or wanted by the object
7
8

of the advances.

The term "sexual advances", however, should encompass attempts
to make physical contact, repeated sexual propositions, and demands
for sexual relations. In Katz, the plaintiff was subjected to sexual
advances through repeated sexual propositions.8 8 Therefore, it could
be found that the reasonable person in these circumstances could
have been subjected to a hostile environment even though most of
the complaints consisted of language alone. Courts should have no
difficulty determining that sexual harassment has created an abusive
environment in situations where unwanted physical or sexual advances
are coupled with persistent verbal insults.
There still remains the problem of work environment sexual harassment where the employee is only abused through words. Again,

82.

See Sand v. Johnson, 33 FEP Cases 716 (E.D. Mich. 1982)(holding that

an employee was not subject to hostile environment where supervisor attempted
mere flirtatious relationship).
83. 106 S. Ct. at 2406.
84. Id.
85. Id. (emphasis added).
86. Id.
87. See Reichmann v. Bureau of Affirmative Action, 536 F. Supp. 1149,
1177 (M.D. Pa. 1977).
88. Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d at 254. It is not explicitly stated in the opinion

whether the supervisor physically made an advance or merely suggested that he and
the plaintiff have sexual relations.
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the proper standard of assessing whether or not the conduct rises to
the level to be actionable would be the reasonable person standard.
However, because there is no other outward manifestation to link
with the verbal abuses, and because first amendment rights are so
fundamental, the analysis must go one step further.8 9
In order to protect freedom of expression rights and to insure that
de minimis conduct is not actionable, a standard for determining
liability should be outlined where sexual harassment based upon
insults alone is claimed. In most instances where insults and sexist
comments are the only behavior claimed to be harassing, the victim
is overly sensitive to the subject matter of the insult. 90 The common
law of torts fails to recognize a cause of action for mere insults. 9'
However, when mere insults become so pervasive, severe, and abusive
that they interfere with the psychological well-being of a reasonable
person in the victim's particular working environment, a cause of
action should be available. If such intolerable insults are offensive
and psychologically abusive to the ordinary person, then the freedom
to express these thoughts should be impeded. Thus, even though free
speech is a constitutionally protected right, and insults alone do not
make a cause of action, 92 when insults go as far as becoming
psychologically debilitating to the ordinary person, and the ordinary
person would find that the working environment was substantially,
and adversely affected, there should be redress in the judicial system. 93
89. See Rabidue, 584 F. Supp. at 431. This court suggests that where "verbal
conduct of a sexual nature " is the only conduct complained of, a first amendment
issue is immediately raised. Because verbal conduct is the only conduct complained
of, perhaps a more probing analysis is needed to determine whether in fact actionable
sexual harassment has occurred.
90. See EEOC Sexual Harassment Guidelines at 310-11, supra note 80; see
also Higgins v. Gates Rubber Co., 578 F.2d 281, 283 (10th Cir. 1978). The Higgens
court stated that employers are not insurers against all insults and discriminatory
insults that occur in the workplace.
91. Prosser, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 12 at 54-55 (4th ed. 1971);
EEOC Sexual Harassment Guidelines at 311, supra note 80, citing Contreras v.
Crown Zellerbach Corp., 88 Wash. 2d 735, 744, 565 P.2d 1173, 1178 (1977) (en
banc)(Stafford, J., concurring in result).
92. See EEOC Sexual Harassment Guidelines at 310, citing Higgins, 578 F.2d
281; Friend v. Leidinger, 446 F. Supp. 361, 383 (E.D. Va. 1977), aff'd, 558 F.2d
61 (4th Cir. 1978) (holding that infrequent insults do not create a cause of action);
but see EEOC Decision No. CL 68-12-431 EU, 2 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 295 (1969)
(holding that Polish employee offended by Polish jokes stated cause of action).
93. MacKinnon, at 211; see supra note 1. A single incident of insult would
probably not be enough to show an atmosphere which condoned racial and ethnic
intimidation, but a sufficiently derogatory remark or remarks may, and in some
cases, should. See also [1973] EEOC Decisions (CCH)
6346 (1972) in which the
EEOC found cause to believe that racial discrimination had occurred when a district
manager used the term "nigger" in a joke.
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The objective victim standard illustrated throughout this article
would protect women from unreasonable, uncalled for abuses in the
workplace, while also protecting employers from lawsuits filed by
overly sensitive victims. The recent case of Rabidue v. Osceola
Refining Co. 9 4 exemplifies this notion. In Rabidue, a female employee
brought an action under Title VII in which she claimed a hostile and
abusive work environment was created when her supervisor directed
vulgar language at her and displayed sexually oriented posters in
front of her. 95 The District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan
applied an objective victim test in determining whether or not this
conduct amounted to a significant factor which an average female
employee would find to substantially and adversely affect her overall
work experience. 96 The court held that EEOC Guidelines section
1604.11(a)(3) state that the conduct complained of must have the
''purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's
work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive
work environment. ' 97 The word "unreasonably" was construed to
mean that courts may consider the nature of the employment environment in which the plaintiff suffered the alleged harassment. 98 In
this context, the court would be able to apply the objective victim
test. 99 The objective victim in the particular working environment of
the plaintiff would be the standard from which to assess whether or
not sexual harassment occurred.' °o This court also considered the
particular educational backgrounds of the employees and the physical
make-up of the plaintiff's work area.' 0' The reason for the extra
analysis to the objective test was that people in different social classes
and varying educational backgrounds have come to expect certain
types of behavior and language in the workplace. 02 The court did
not state that because women were now viable members of all facets
of the workforce, such particular behavior and language should
change. 103 This attitude reflects a type of consent. In other words,
before women began to work in certain occupations, those work

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

534 F. Supp. 419 (E.D. Mich. 1984).
Id.
Id. at 433.
Id. at 429; Guidelines, § 1604.11(a)(3).
Rabidue, 534 F. Supp. at 430.
Id.
Id. at 430, 433.
Id. at 430.
Id.
Id.
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environments were cluttered with various types of behavior that many
women would find offensive.'0 4 Hence, the court seemingly believed
that it was the woman who had to accept the work environment,
rather than the work environment changing to accept the woman. 05
The court stated:
It cannot seriously be disputed that in some work environments, humor
and language are rough hewn [sic] and vulgar. Sexual jokes, sexual
conversations and girlie magazines may abound. Title VII was not
meant to-or can-change this. It must never be forgotten that Title VII
is the federal court mainstay in the struggle for equal employment
opportunity for the female workers of America. But it is quite different
to claim that Title VII was designed to bring about a magical transformation in the social mores of American workers.'06
By utilizing the objective victim standard, traditional work environments, where rough language and sexual conversation abound,
would not need to change. However, when individual women employees become the object of unreasonably offensive conduct of a
sexual nature, then Title VII protections could be enforced. In Gan
v. Kepro Circuit Systems, Inc.,107 and Evans v. The National Post
Office Mail Handlers Union,0 8 the respective courts concluded that
some work environments, even though polluted with harsh language,
could be conducive to charges of sexual harassment. In Gan, the
plaintiff alleged that a hostile working environment was created when
she was allegedly subjected to unprovoked propositions and sexually
suggestive remarks.' °9 It was held that because she participated in the
vulgarities which were prevalent in the work environment, she was
not a victim of sexual harassment." 0 However, the court stated: "The
evidence established that the working environment at defendant Kepro
Circuit Systems, Inc., was a very distasteful one which, under different circumstances, could certainly be conducive to sexual harassment charges.""'
Gan suggests that if the plaintiff had not participated in the
vulgarities and sexual conversations in the workplace, there would
have been a different result. It would be much more effective in

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id.
Id.
Id
28 FEP Cases 639 (E.D. Mo. 1982).
32 FEP Cases 634 (D. D.C. 1983).
28 FEP Cases at 640.
Id. at 641.
Id.
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situations where a work environment is pervaded with vulgarities and
sexual talk if the conduct which is alleged to be abusive were assessed
objectively. If, for instance, Ms. Gan had not been a participant
who welcomed the vulgarities, and the work environment was such
that conduct, behavior, and language directed at the plaintiff would
offend the ordinary prudent person, the result would have been
different from a situation where such conduct was merely commonplace among the workers and was not directed at anyone. In the
latter instance, it would be difficult to say that the reasonable prudent
person would find that the work environment was substantially and
1
adversely affected.'

2

In Evans, the plaintiff had a consensual sexual relationship with
her supervisor but, after the relationship soured, she alleged sexual
harassment based upon the creation of a hostile environment." 3 The
work environment became extremely distasteful for the plaintiff and
it was pervaded with sexual innuendoes."1 4 However, because the
plaintiff welcomed the conduct of which she later complained, no
Title VII violation had occurred., 5 The court cited Gan, stating that
if the plaintiff had not freely welcomed the advances of her super16
visors, then a different result may have ensued."
In summary, if courts adopt an objective victim standard for
assessing behavior in hostile environment sexual harassment claims,
then the interest of Title VII in eliminating workplace discrimination
would be furthered while also protecting employers from frivolous
lawsuits from overly-sensitive individuals." 7 The standard would assess behavior from the viewpoint of the ordinary reasonable person
in the particular employment setting of the plaintiff."' If the conduct
of which the plaintiff complained was severe enough that the reasonable prudent person would be so offended that she would find
that her working environment had changed from an abuse-free environment to an abusive environment, a cause of action would be
stated. In situations where the conduct complained of amounts to

112.

In situations where the working environment is cluttered with hard-core

profanities and abusive remarks, the test would be to determine whether or not the
ordinary prudent person would be adversely affected in such a way that she would

find the existing environment intolerable to work in.
113. 32 FEP Cases at 636.
114. Id. at 637.
115. Id. at 636.
116. Id.at 637.
117. See Harassment Claims at 1458.
118. See Rabidue, 584 F. Supp. at 433.
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mostly verbal abuse, courts would consider the totality of the circumstances to see if any overt, non-verbal behavior related to the
sexual abuses had occurred. If even one instance of overt, non-verbal
behavior was found, then coupled with the verbal abuses, it could
be enough to overcome the first amendment right to free speech. In
cases where speech is absolutely the only complained of behavior,
courts could further determine whether or not the verbal abuses
would be psychologically debilitating to the ordinary prudent person.
If the ordinary prudent person would find that the verbal abuses did
substantially affect her psychological well-being, then first amendment protections would be overcome. Finally, Title VII was not
meant or designed to change certain work environments wherein
vulgar language, sexual jokes and offensive conversations may
abound." 9 In these circumstances one who enters such a workforce
has consented to the existing environment.

I1.

RESPONSIBILITIES OF EMPLOYER AND VICTIM IN SEX HARASSMENT
SITUATIONS

A. Responsibility of Management
There are different theories as to why workplace sexual harassment
occurs. Professor MacKinnon suggests that the historical subservience
of women in society and the disproportionate share of wealth and
power between the sexes is a viable explanation. 120 There is no
question that the workforce in American society and the majority of
supervisory and managerial positions are dominated by males.
In this regard, employers have a responsibility to provide a working
2
environment which is free from all types of discriminatory behavior. '
This responsibility consists of management's duty to inform employees of company policies regarding sexual harassment, and to take
immediate action to deal promptly with known sexual harassment

situations.

122

119. Id. at 430.
120. MacKinnon, at 9.
121. See Meritor Savings, 106 S. Ct. 2399.
122. Employers are liable for hostile environment sexual harassment only when
the employer either knew or should have known of the activity. However, the United
States Supreme Court in Meritor Savings Bank, 106 S. Ct. 2399 (1986), declined to
address this issue. See also Ferguson, 560 F. Supp. at 1198; Coley v. Consolidated
Rail Corp., 561 F. Supp. 645 (E.D. Mich. 1982)(holding that in hostile environment
sexual harassment cases, a supervisor who demeans and offends an employee acts
outside the scope of the authority he possesses, and thus, his behavior cannot be
imputed to his employer); Katz, 709 F.2d at 255; Cummings v. Walsh Constr. Co.,
561 F. Supp .872 (S.D. Ga. 1983). See also Cope, Executive Guide To Employment
Practices 118 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Cope].
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Employers have a responsibility to ensure that best efforts have
been undertaken to provide a work environment that is free from
unreasonably abusive behavior.' 23 This is not to imply that employers
must ensure that the working environment is friendly or pleasant.
The employer need only ensure that unreasonably abusive behavior
is controlled. To provide such an environment, employers are wise
to adhere to a few procedures that, if followed, will greatly reduce
the incidents of harassment and cure those that do occur.
First, employers should adopt a company policy that defines sexual
harassment and clearly indicates that such behavior will not be
tolerated. 24 The policy should be presented to every employee, including managerial personnel. 125 It should outline what types of
specific conduct are considered to be sexual harassment, including
insults and verbal abuse. 126 The policy should outline a grievance
procedure that employees should utilize if any of the aforementioned
activities occur.127 It would be appropriate to appoint a woman who
has a high management ranking to hear complaints of women employees. It should be emphasized that such a complaint procedure
would be implemented with strict confidentiality to encourage reporting of all such incidents. Finally, the policy should outline a
disciplinary process when such conduct is found. This process could
classify varying degrees of punishment depending upon the severity
and frequency of abusive conduct. For example, first time offenders
would be given a written warning to the effect that if such behavior
is not discontinued then a harsher penalty would ensue. Second
offenses would warrant suspension without pay and a third offense
would warrant dismissal. By implementing and adhering to such a
strict disciplinary procedure, employers not only shield themselves
from liability if a Title VII action is brought, but also effectively
diminish the occurrences of abusive behavior. Of course, the full
cooperation of women employees is a necessary prerequisite to the
effectiveness of such a policy, because merely having a policy that
prohibits such behavior will not shield liability.
In Cummings v. Walsh Construction Company,128 it was held that
merely having a policy which prohibits, sexual harassment has little

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

See supra note 120.
Cope, at 119.
Id.
Id.
Id.
561 F. Supp. 872 (S.D. Ga. 1983).
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or no significance if prompt remedial action is not taken. 29 There,
the plaintiff claimed that she was approached several times by her
supervisor and propositioned for sexual relations.' 30 She also claimed
that on two occasions she submitted to these demands because the
supervisor promised to leave her alone if she did so.' After submitting to these demands twice, the plaintiff refused the supervisor's
further demands, and because of this refusal she claimed that she
was required to perform menial, unpleasant tasks. 3 2 Following her
refusal to perform such tasks, the plaintiff was fired.'33 The court
concluded that even if the employer had a policy prohibiting such
harassment, it could be liable if prompt remedial action was not
34
taken upon discovering the harassing behavior.'
Conversely, in the Ferguson case, it was held that because the
employer did take prompt remedial action no liability would be
incurred,'3 5 and in Barrett because the bank took prompt disciplinary
action once it discovered the offensive conduct, it was held not
liable. 3 6 Thus, it can be said that even where sexual harassment
occurs, if employers take prompt remedial and disciplinary action to
7
stop it, no liability will be incurred. 1
Secondly, employers must institute an effective investigatory procedure once complaints are lodged. It would be a great disservice to
the entire workforce if someone was disciplined for no valid reason.
There are numerous instances where a woman claims to have been
sexually harassed when in fact she was partly or mostly at fault. 3 '
One such case is Reichman v. Bureau of Affirmative Action, 3 9 where
the plaintiff alleged she was subjected to a "hostile environment "
when her supervisor attempted to have sexual relations with her.' 4°
The Reichman court found the plaintiff had behaved flirtatiously

129. Id.
130. Id.at 876.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.at 878.
134. Id.
135. 560 F. Supp. at 1199.
136. 584 F. Supp. at 31.
137. See Ferguson, 560 F. Supp. at 1199; Barrett, 584 F. Supp. at 31.
138. See Gan v. Kepro Circuit Systems, Inc., 28 FEP Cases 639 (E.D. Mo.
1982); Evans v. The Nat'l Post Office Mail Handlers Union, 32 FEP Cases 634 (D.
D.C. 1983); Reichman v. Bureau of Affirmative Action, 536 F. Supp. 1149 (M.D.
Pa. 1982).
1-39. 536 F. Supp. 1149 (M.D. Pa. 1982).
140. Id.at 1164.
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and had welcomed any sexual advances which may have been made.' 4'
42
Therefore, no Title VII violation was found.
Reichman illustrates the necessity for an effective investigatory
process. In such cases where alleged harassment occurs, the facts and
circumstances surrounding the alleged conduct must be discerned.
Employers should appoint a committee to be in charge of investigating all complaints of harassment. By thoroughly investigating all
matters, employers could determine whether the alleged conduct was
in fact unwarranted, abusive and offensive.The Reichman case clearly
shows there are instances where it is the woman who initiates the
sexual contact. In cases where this occurs, women cannot claim they
have been sexually harassed until the conduct of the male becomes
43
unreasonably abusive.
Finally, employers would be wise to institute training seminars for
all managerial personnel. These seminars would educate all managers
as to what types of behavior are prohibited and what can be done
in potentially harassing situations. Such an education program would
be very effective in eliminating certain types of behavior because
many times behavior not meant to be demeaning, offensive, or
harassing is perceived by women to be so.'" Education would make
all managerial staff members cognizant and perceptive of the problems faced in the workplace.
B.

Responsibility of Victim

While employers have a great responsibility to provide employees
with a policy that explains what types of behavior will not be
tolerated, what to do and where to report if such behavior does
occur, and what measures will be taken to eliminate such behavior,
the system cannot be effective without the cooperation of the entire
workforce. It is imperative that aggrieved employees utilize the complaint procedures mentioned before marching into a court of law.
Since the goal of anti-discrimination policies and Title VII is to
eliminate discrimination from the work environment, workplace harassment cannot be eradicated unless all instances of harassing behavior are reported so that measures can be taken to eliminate such

141. Id. at 1177.
142. Id.
143. See Gan, 28 FEP Cases 639 (E.D. Mo. 1982) and Evans, 32 FEP Cases
634 (D. D.C. 1983).
144. See supra note 1.
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behavior. By remedying offensive behavior, no matter how isolated
or trivial, both the interests of the employer and employee are
furthered. The interests of the employee are furthered when steps
are taken to eliminate the reported abuses from the work environment. An investigation would take place, and if abusive conduct did
occur, measures would be taken to prevent any further occurrences.
Thus, an abuse-free environment would be available in which to
work. The interest of the employer is furthered in that an abuse-free
work environment makes for happier employees, and happier employees are more productive than disgruntled employees. In addition
to a higher efficiency in work product, the employer is spared from
Title VII lawsuits or liability.
The responsibilities of the female employee are twofold. First, the
female employee must utilize company grievance procedures as long
as the procedure is confidential and the female has a person other
than the harasser to direct complaints. As discussed earlier, it is
highly suggested that employers appoint either a female manager or
employ a female counselor to hear such grievances. This way it
cannot be argued that the grievance procedure is biased or sexist.
Secondly, women have a responsibility not to encourage males to
make sexual advances. This can be done by refraining from acting
in a flirtatious or sexually inviting manner, dressing in a sexually
provocative manner or talking in a manner that would welcome
sexual advances. The Supreme Court has implied that where a
woman, by her conduct, indicates that sexual advances are welcome
a cause of action under Title VII will not lie. 45 Furthermore, the
Supreme Court has held there is no rule against admitting evidence
of a woman's dress or sexually provocative speech in order to
determine whether or not sexual advances were unwelcome.

46

It

would not be unreasonable to conclude that where a woman clad
herself in sexually provocative clothing, acted and spoke in a provocative manner, or otherwise indicated she may have been interested
47
in a sexual relationship, sexual advances were not unwelcome.
It should be emphasized that women have a fundamental responsibility to notify the employer of instances of sexual harassment,
insult or abuse. Before claims of sexual harassment can be actionable,
women should notify the employer in order to give that employer an

145. Meritor Savings Bank, 106 S. Ct. at 2406.
146. Id. at 2407.
147. Id. at 2406.
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opportunity to remedy the situation. Although it has been held that
no liability will be incurred by an employer in a hostile environment
case where knowledge or constructive knowledge is absent,1 48 the
expense of lengthy litigation could be saved if the notion were
expanded to deny a cause of action where the proper procedures
were not followed. A court could merely determine whether a complaint was filed internally. If the victim did follow the proper
procedures, but no remedial action was taken, then a trial on the
merits could ensue. However, if the proper internal procedures were
not exhausted, then the victim should be deemed to have waived her
right to sue.
III.

A

SUGGESTED FRAMEWORK FOR ELIMINATING SEXUAL
HARASSMENT

In addition to implementing a company policy, an investigation
procedure, a complaint procedure and training program, employers
should treat all employees equally and require that all employees,
including management, adhere to company policy. If such a requirement is instituted, and an employee fails to adhere to it, then that
49
person can probably be discharged for violating company policy.1
Also, employers should be consistent in the application of company
policies. Once a policy is adopted and procedures are outlined, the
employer should not vary from the policy or procedures. Thus,
employees and management personnel will be informed as to what
to expect in a harassment situation. It is important that management
create an atmosphere that discourages discrimination and sexual
harassment in order to eliminate such forces of abusive behavior and
avoid liability under Title VII.
P.J. Murray
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See supra note 122.
See Cope, at 119.

